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The Right to Private Property and its 
Enforcement: the Changing Public-
Private Divide in the PRC 
TING XU ∗
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY
Litigating	the	Constitution	is	very	difficult	in	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	(PRC),	as	it	
is not justiciable and there is no separation of powers, either as doctrine or as practice. 
However,	the	post-Mao	legal	reforms	have	slowly	helped	to	create	new	attitudes	among	
Chinese legal professionals and theorists. And in the wake of the 1999 amendment to article 
5	of	 the	Constitution,	 in	which	 the	PRC	 committed	 itself	 to	 ‘governance	 in	 accordance	
with	 the	 rule	 of	 law’,	 significant	 attempts	 were	 made	 to	 challenge	 the	 Constitution’s	
non-justiciability, including the use of civil suits.1	The	attempt	to	broaden	the	role	of	the	
Constitution	so	 that	 it	meaningfully	protects	 the	private	rights	of	citizens	 is	an	attempt	
to overcome a problem of ‘empty’ constitutional rights in post-Mao China, and to create 
instead a system of genuinely enforceable constitutional entitlements.2 
There is one important area of constitutional rights in contemporary China that has 
not yet been properly considered, however: the issue of the right to private property and 
its	 enforcement.	 This	 problem	 has	 received	 only	 limited	 attention	 by	Chinese	 scholars	
and practitioners. The question is: in the contemporary legal system, can Chinese people 
defend their private property rights, newly incorporated into the 2004 Constitution as one 
kind of constitutional right, when infringed? To answer this question, we need to examine 
∗ London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science,	University	of	London.
1 For	 example,	 QI	 Yuling	 v.	 CHEN	Xiaoqi.	 Qi	 and	 Chen	 took	 the	 same	 entrance	 examination	 for	 higher	
education.	Qi	 passed,	 but	Chen	 failed.	However,	 arranged	 by	Chen’s	 father,	 a	 local	 cadre,	Chen	 took	Qi’s	
identity	and	received	a	place	in	a	college.	After	11	years,	Qi	discovered	the	truth	and	started	legal	suits	against	
Chen	 for	 infringement	 upon	 Qi’s	 identity	 and	 rights	 to	 education.	 The	 Supreme	 People’s	 Court’s	 (SPC’s)	
interpretation	supported	Qi’s	claims	for	her	constitutional	rights	to	education	and,	instructed	by	the	SPC,	the	
provincial court ruled in her favour. The SPC’s 2001 interpretation in this case is seen as a milestone in Chinese 
constitutionalism	and	regarded	as	‘China’s	first	constitutional	case’.	However,	the	attempts	(most	are	indeed	
from the grassroots) of the judicialisation of the Constitution (xianfa sifa hua) have been suppressed. On 18 
December	2008,	the	SPC	withdrew	its	2001	interpretation,	and	it	was	‘no	longer	applied’.	Instead,	it	is	officially	
declared that judicial decision-making should be made in terms of the ‘three supremes’ (sange zhishang): party 
interests, public opinion and legal rules. 
2 See	CAI	Dingjian	(2005)	‘Zhongguo	xianfa	sifahua	lujing	tansuo’	(‘The	Exploration	of	the	Path	towards	the	
Judicialisation of the Constitution in China’) Faxue yanjue (The Legal Study) 5 at 110. 
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the nature of private property rights, remedies provided for violation of private property 
rights and the barriers preventing protection of property rights through litigation in the 
courts in China today. In so doing, the article will also consider the changing nature of the 
public-private divide in Chinese law and society. 
THE REVIVAL OF PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CASE OF ‘THE 
MOST STUBBORN HOUSE OWNER’
In China the private (si) has long been considered inferior to the public (gong). The advent 
of	socialist	rule	in	1949	brought	significant	changes	to	the	official	conception	of	property,	
including	 an	 intensification	 of	 this	 inferiority.	 Between	 1956	 and	 1978,	 ‘private’	 was	
often	 characterised	 as	 ‘evil’	 and	was	 virtually	 abolished.	 Since	 1978,	 after	 almost	 three	
decades of this,3 a ‘revival’ of private property has been set in motion by market reforms 
in	three	ownership	sectors,	conceptualised	in	the	PRC	as	relatively	distinct:	that	is,	first,	
through the processes of dismantling rural communes, secondly, the acceptance of private 
enterprise and the reform of state-owned enterprises, and thirdly the emergence of urban 
property markets. Along with these processes, the status of private ownership has been 
increasingly, albeit gradually, recognised by law. This can be seen in various constitutional 
amendments. Up to 2004, amendments pertaining to the selective rehabilitation of the 
‘private’ included: acknowledgement of the ‘individual economy’ (geti jingji) (1982); 
acceptance that a private economy (siying jingji) would be allowed to develop within the 
limits prescribed by law; recognition of urban land use rights transfer (1988); establishment 
of	a	‘socialist	market	economy’	(1993);	acceptance	of	the	individual	and	private	economy	
as	important	components	of	the	socialist	market	economy	(1999);	and	finally	recognition	
of important private property rights. Since 2004, private property rights have become 
one	kind	of	constitutional	right.	The	Property	Law	that	came	into	effect	in	20074	defines	
ownership as an absolute and supreme right in China, and equal protection for public and 
private	property	is	stipulated	in	the	law	for	the	first	time	since	1949.	It	also	gives	a	clear	
demarcation of state ownership, collective ownership and private ownership. Enforcement 
of the Property Law may seem to provide ordinary people with remedies through civil 
litigation when there is infringement of their private property rights. 
Yet private property rights are still vulnerable in various ways. Despite constitutional 
guarantees,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 protect	 private	 property	 rights	 through	 the	 Chinese	 legal	
system. Indeed, very soon after the passing of Property Law by the National People’s 
Congress	(NPC)	in	2007,	the	case	of	‘China’s	most	stubborn	house	owner’	(literally,	‘the	
nailed down house’, dingzi hu,	meaning	a	stubborn	household	that	is	difficult	to	coerce)5 
3 Private	ownership	was	not	formally	abolished	in	1949,	and	a	mixed	economy	was	adopted	between	1949	and	
1956 as a prelude to nationalisation of private capital. Whether nor not a complete system of public ownership 
was established is unclear. For example, art 11 of the 1954 Constitution recognised private property: ‘the State 
protects	the	right	of	citizens	to	own	lawfully-earned	incomes,	savings,	houses	and	other	means	of	life’;	and	art	
12	provides:	‘the	State	protects	the	right	of	citizens	to	inherit	private	property	according	to	law’.	Art	11	of	the	
1954	Constitution	was	restated	in	art	9	of	the	1975	Constitution,	but	‘the	right	to	inherit	private	property’	was	
abandoned. 
4 The	 Property	 Law	was	 promulgated	 by	 the	 National	 People’s	 Congress	 (NPC)	 on	 16	March	 2007,	 and	
implemented	on	1	October	2007.	
5 The	name	 refers	 to	 local	 residents	who	 refuse	 the	 local	 government’s	 order	 to	move	out	 of	 their	 homes	
for	settlement.	These	households	are	usually	forcibly	relocated	to	make	way	for	commercial	projects,	and	are	
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generated heated debate on the issue of enforcement of the Property Law and protection 
of private property rights.6 
This case concerned a couple resident in Jiulongpo District of Chongqing, Ms Wu Ping 
and Mr Yang Wu. The couple refused to move out of their house in order to make way 
for a commercial project, even after the district court issued a judgment of forced eviction 
against them and when the construction work around their house turned their residence 
into	an	islet.	The	couple	placed	a	Chinese	national	flag	on	the	roof	of	their	house	with	a	
hand-painted	banner	proclaiming:	‘a	citizen’s	legal	property	is	not	to	be	encroached	upon’	
(gongmin hefa de siyou caichan burong qinfan). The ‘islet’ stood alone in a 20-metre deep man-
made	pit,	and	all	utilities	supplies	were	cut	off.7 
This	case	was	seen	as	the	first	test	of	the	guarantees	of	private	property	rights	in	China	
offered	by	the	new	Property	Law	and	by	the	Constitution.8 However, in reality the case is 
not particularly novel: it is just one of the innumerable instances in which private houses 
and apartments have been demolished by government-backed development projects 
with	residents	offered	unfair	compensation	and	suffering	forced	eviction.	Although	the	
Wu family resisted these pressures for a while, they eventually gave up and accepted the 
compensation	 offered	 by	 the	 developers	 through	mediation	 by	 the	 court	 and	 the	 local	
government. Their house was then demolished.9 
The problematic issues in this case include, in particular, the correctness of the legal 
and administrative procedures used to secure agreement for demolition (the ‘due process’ 
of demolition) and the basis of the judgment on the case handed down by the Jiulongpo 
district	court	(the	court	of	first	instance)	in	Chongqing.	A	detailed	examination	of	the	case	
shows	obvious	conflicts	between	national	legislation	and	local	regulations,	and	between	
local judicial authority and the protection of civil rights. The district court’s judgment 
was based on a local regulation which is clearly divergent from national legislation 
—	that	 is,	 there	 are	 clear	 conflicts	 between	 the	 ‘Regulations	 for	Management	of	Urban	
Residential Demolition and Eviction’ issued by the State Council and those of Chongqing 
Municipality.10	In	addition,	according	to	articles	12,	13	and	58	of	the	Land	Administration	
compensated by property developers or local governments. But usually the compensation is not adequate, 
and	this	is	the	main	source	of	conflicts	between	the	residents	and	property	developers.	The	residents	refuse	to	
move, even though construction is proceeding around their home. Before this case, ‘dizi hu’ was often used as a 
negative term referring to a ‘trouble-maker’. But here it has a more positive meaning, referring to people who 
are brave enough to protect their property rights against external encroachment. 
6 The	images	and	reports	of	the	house	were	headlines	in	newspapers,	and	discussions	about	the	case	flooded	
internet	chat	rooms.	There	were	also	different	translations	for	the	name	of	the	case:	 in	addition	to	‘the	most	
stubborn house owner’, others included ‘the most unco-operative house owner’, ‘the coolest’ and ‘the most 
persistent’. 
7 See	ZHENG 	Zhu	 (2007)	 ‘Dingzihu	weihe	 zheyang	niu?’	 (‘Why	 is	 the	Nail	House	owner	 so	 stubborn?’)	
Zhongguo xinwen zhoukan (Chinese News Weekly)	 30	 March,	 available	 at:	 http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2007-03-
30/140912655314.shtml.	
8 See	NI Ching-Ching	(2007)	‘A	Tall	Stand	for	Property	Rights	in	China’ Los Angeles Times	30	March,	available	
at:	 http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-nailhouse30mar30,1,3954342.story?ctrack=1&cset=	
true. 
9 The	outcome	of	the	dispute	is	discussed	in	ZHANG 	Jialin	(2007)	‘“Chongqing	zuiniu	dingzihu	jianzhu”	
yi bei chai chu’ (‘“The house of the most stubborn house owner” in Chongqing has been demolished’) Renmin 
wang (People.com)	2	April,	available	at:	http://society.people.com.cn/GB/1062/5553732.html.	
10 For	 example,	 art	 7	 of	 State	Council	 ‘Regulations	 for	Management	 of	Urban	Residential	Demolition	 and	
Eviction’ (2001) and art 10 of Chongqing ‘Regulations for Management of Urban Residential Demolition and 
Eviction’	(2003).	The	latter	does	not	stress	the	approval	documents	regarding	state-owned	land	use	rights	as	a	
condition to proceed with housing demolition. 
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Law, amended in 2004,11 the procedure for demolition should be that the local government 
requisitions the land use rights (LURs) owned by the former residents and changes the 
land registration record, and then the local government sells the LURs to the developers. 
Developers may then apply for approval of demolition and proceed to construction. 
However, in ‘the most stubborn house owner’ case, the district government did not 
requisition the LURs and amend the recorded land registration before it sold the LURs 
to developers, and the developers carried out the demolition without the necessary state-
owned	 land	use	 rights	 certificate	 (guoyou tudi shiyongquan zheng). Using a metaphor to 
describe this situation, local people characterised the problem as one in which the district 
government ‘married the daughter twice’ (yi nü er jia).12 In this situation, even though 
article 4 of the Property Law states that ‘private property shall not be infringed upon’, it 
proved impossible for the owners of the house to assert their rights through the Property 
Law or the Constitution, so that we can see an obvious lack of enforceability of both of 
these.13 When the district government infringed the Constitution and the Property Law, 
residents could only refer to general principles to claim their rights, but where were the 
specific	mechanisms	of	enforcement?	So,	the	question	becomes:	why	is	the	enforceability	
of	the	Property	Law	and	the	Constitution	so	difficult?	Let	us	focus	on	the	land	rights.	
STRONG PUBLIC POWER AND VULNERABLE
PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
The precise identity of the holders of ownership rights of both urban and rural property in 
land is unclear. While state-owned land may be leased through the LUR system, the ‘state’14 
retains its ownership of urban land and the ‘collective’ maintains its ownership of rural 
land; indeed, it is often unclear who owns rural land in China: the farmers themselves, 
collective economic organisations or local governments. In these circumstances, the extent 
to which the Chinese people ‘own’ private property in land is uncertain. Land use rights 
are vulnerable to compulsory requisition by the state, and ordinary owners do not have 
security for their property. Partly as a result of this lack of clarity, house demolition 
(chai qian)	in	urban	China,	and	land	seizure	in	rural	areas,	have	become	major	problems,	
generating much social unrest and even riots in contemporary China. This section focuses 
on vulnerable property rights in relation to land requisition and on forced eviction as one 
of	the	major	sources	of	land	disputes	and	conflict.	
Land Acquisition and Compulsory Requisition of Land Use Rights
Private property rights in land and housing are susceptible to land acquisition (tudi 
zhengshou) and the requisition of LURs (tudi shiyongquan zhengyong). Both the Chinese 
11 Amended	version	was	promulgated	and	in	force	on	28	August	2004.	
12 See	DUAN Hongqing and WANG 	Heyan	(2007)	‘Chongqing	dingzihu	shijian:	meiyou	yingjia	de	duizhi’ 
(‘The Case of the Nailed Down House in Chongqing: Confrontation without Winners’) Caijing Magazine 2 April, 
available	at:	http://www.caijing.com.cn/newcn/ruleoflaw/other/2007-04-02/17498.shtml.	
13 For	example,	it	seems	that	art	4	of	the	Property	Law	is	just	a	repetition	of	arts	12	and	13	of	the	Constitution.	
14 Here	the	question	is	who	can	represent	the	state:	the	central	government	or	local	governments?	
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Constitution15 and the Land Administration Law16 specify that the state, in the public 
interest, may lawfully acquire land owned by collectives. This sets the stage for compulsory 
land acquisition.17 The Land Administration Law states that compensation shall be given 
in accordance with the original use of the acquired land,18 and it is to be calculated as a 
package	that	includes	compensation	for	the	land,	resettlement	subsidies	and	compensation	
for	fixtures	to,	and	young	or	‘green’	crops	on,	the	acquired	land.	Although	article	42	of	the	
Property Law expands the scope of compensation to include ‘premiums for social security 
of the farmers’ in order to guarantee their normal standard of living and to safeguard 
their lawful rights and interests, the compensation does not have to be paid at full market 
price. As a result, local governments may acquire rural land from farmers at a low price, 
sell	it	on	to	property	developers	at	a	much	higher	price	and	so	make	a	great	profit.19 This is 
clearly unfair to the owners of private property, and quite inconsistent with the provisions 
of equal protection. 
What ‘public interest’ (gonggong liyi) actually means is not at all clear in either the 
Constitution or the Property Law. Moreover, the Supreme People’s Court has not as yet 
issued any interpretation to clarify the meaning of the terms ‘public interest’ or ‘public 
use’. Mansions, golf courses and lavish government buildings are being established in 
many parts of China today in the name of ‘public interest’ and at the expense of productive 
agricultural land. Governments are ill equipped to address the issues that have emerged 
from land acquisition and requisition of LURs, often because their own interests are 
involved. 
Moreover, because rural land is collectively owned, what farmers actually possess are 
only land use rights. When the state acquires ownership of rural land from rural collectives, 
the LURs of farmers are lost accordingly. In practice, land resumption in rural China is a 
requisition of the LURs of farmers for the purpose of urban development. Land requisition 
in urban China takes the form of housing demolition and forced eviction, and a requisition 
of the LURs of urban residents.20 Compulsory requisition of LURs of (both rural and 
urban) land is stipulated in article 44 of the Property Law: ‘for the purpose of emergency 
handling and disaster relief’, real and movable properties of institutions or individuals 
may be reclaimed in line with the procedure and within the authority provided by law. 
Also, after requisition of LURs, the reclaimed properties are to be returned to the owner. 
According	to	article	42(3)	of	the	Property	Law,	when	houses	and	other	properties	owned	
by	farmers	are	acquired,	compensation	for	demolition	and	resettlement	must	be	paid,	but	
there	is	no	specific	provision	for	compensation.	Therefore	farmers	are	vulnerable	to	the	
15 The	Constitution	(2004)	art	10(3).
16 The	LAL	(2004)	art	2(4).
17 Zhengshou is	the	compulsory	acquisition	of	collective	landownership;	it	 is	related	to	--	but	different	from	
-- zhengyong, which is taking of LURs. In this article zhengshou is translated as land acquisition, and zhengyong 
is	translated	as	requisition	of	land	use	rights;	land	seizure	is	a	general	term	that	may	be	used	to	refer	to	both	
zhengshou and zhengyong, as well as illegal conversion of rural land to urban use. 
18 The	LAL	(2004)	art	47.
19 See	Yeh,	AG	 (2005)	 ‘The	Dual	 Land	Market	 and	Urban	Development	 in	China’	 in	DING Chengri and 
SONG Yan (eds) Emerging land and Housing Markets in China	Lincoln	Institute	of	Land	Policy	at	43.	
20 Requisition	of	LURs	of	urban	residents	leads	to	housing	demolition,	according	to	a	principle	established	in	
the law that LURs are inseparable from rights in the buildings, colloquially referred to as fang sui di zou, di sui 
fang zou.	See	the	Urban	Real	Estate	Administration	Law	(1994,	revised	2007)	art	32;	the	Guarantee	Law	(1995)	
art	36;	the	Property	Law	(2007)	art	182.	
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associated problem of the predatory behaviour of local governments and cadres who seek 
to secure an illegal conversion of farmland to commercial and industrial projects.21 
Forced Eviction and Housing Demolition 
Housing demolition in China today usually involves developers, demolition and eviction 
management	 departments	 (affiliated	 to	 local	 land	 administration	 bureaus),	 residents	
and a private demolition company (subcontracted by developers).22 The State Council’s 
‘Regulations for Management of Urban Residential Demolition and Eviction’ (the 2001 
Regulation)23 provides the procedures through which local governments may evict 
residents’ houses and apartments. Qiangzhi chaiqian (forced eviction) is provided in 
article	17:	city	and	county	governments	may	ask	relevant	departments	(often	through	the	
demolition and eviction department) to proceed with forced eviction, or the demolition and 
eviction management department may apply for an order of forced eviction by the people’s 
court, even when residents (including both homeowners and tenants) refuse relocation. In 
reality, there is an obvious failure to provide adequate compensation, due process and 
effective	remedies.	Forced	eviction	in	most	cases	has	been	transformed	into	what	has	been	
called in China ‘violent eviction’ or ‘savage eviction’ (yeman chaiqian),	involving	cutting	off	
water and electricity, physical harassment and assault, breaking into properties and even 
arson, often carried out by secret societies and other thuggish elements.24 
The	2001	Regulation	is	an	administrative	norm	which	conflicts	with	provisions	of	the	
higher-level	laws.	For	example,	the	Constitution	(amended	2004,	article	13),	the	Property	
Law	(2007,	articles	42	and	44)	and	the	Urban	Real	Estate	Administration	Law	(1994,	article	
19) stress ‘public interest’ as the reason for land acquisition, and ‘emergency handling and 
disaster	relief’	as	the	reason	for	requisition	of	LURs.	But	article	7	of	the	2001	Regulation	does	
not specify either ‘public interest’ or ‘emergency handling and disaster relief’. Requisition 
of LURs in the 2001 Regulation is in reality the taking of properties through administrative 
means (xingzheng shouduan).25 Furthermore, in the requisition of LURs, the property rights 
of evictees are often ignored; no mechanism is provided for negotiation between evictees 
and developers, nor between evictees and local governments; compensation standards in 
21 See CAI Yongshun	 (2003)	 ‘Collective	Ownership	 or	 Cadres’	 Ownership?	 The	Non-Agricultural	 Use	 of	
Farmland in China’ The China Quarterly 662-80. 
22 Davis,	MS	and LIN Hai (2004) ‘Demolished: Forced Evictions and the Tenants’ Rights Movement in China’ 
16 Human Rights Watch 4	available	at:	http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/china0304/index.htm.	
23 Chengshi	Fangwu	Chaiqian	Guanli	Tiaoli	(Regulations	for	Management	of	Urban	Residential	Demolition	
and Eviction) promulgated by the State Council on 22 March 1991, implemented on 1 June 1991. This regulation 
was revised and promulgated by the State Council on 6 June 2001, implemented on 1 November 2001. After 
the	implementation	of	the	Property	Law	(2007),	the	implementation	of	provisions	in	the	2001	Regulation	that	
contradict the Property Law has been terminated. But the Property Law does not specify procedures of housing 
demolition or enforcement of the law. The amendment of the Urban Real Estate Management was adopted 
by	the	standing	committee	of	the	NPC	on	30	August	2007,	but	the	amendment	still	grants	power	to	the	State	
Council to promulgate regulations concerning housing demolition and compensation standards. 
24 See	 eg	 Pan,	 PP	 (2005)	 ‘Chinese	 Peasants	Attacked	 in	 Land	 Dispute’	 Washington Post 15 June. See also 
Griffiths,	D	 (2005)	 ‘China	Faces	Growing	Land	Disputes’	BBC News,	available	at:	http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
asia-pacific/4728025.stm. On reports on Chinese media, see eg a special edition available at: http://news.qq.com/
zt/2005/hebeiding/index.htm. 
25 This	also	infringes	the	provisions	of	the	Lifa	Fa	(The	Legislation	Law	of	the	PRC),	promulgated	by	the	NPC	
on	15	March	2000	and	in	force	on	1	July	2000.	Art	79	of	the	Legislation	Law	provides:	‘National	Law	has	higher	
authority than administrative regulations.’
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most	cases	are	low;	there	is	a	lack	of	judicial	remedies,	so	that	for	example,	even	if	plaintiffs	
win a lawsuit, their home may have already been demolished. 
The	 conflict	 between	 regulations	 and	 laws	 such	 as	 between	 the	 2001	 Regulation	
and the higher-level laws in present-day China should be understood in the context 
of urbanisation and the housing reform. The ‘Regulations for Management of Urban 
Residential	Demolition	and	Eviction’	first	emerged	in	1991	(revised	in	2001)	and	worked	
as a supplement to the Urban Planning Law,26 in order to encourage urban construction 
and improve the living conditions of urban residents. But the pace of housing reform 
and	housing	commodification	has	accelerated	since	the	1990s,	and	commercial	property	
developers have monopolised housing construction and provision, and have often formed 
a partnership with local governments. As a result, the 2001 Regulation seems to have 
met the needs of commercial developers but ignored the interests of urban residents. 
Developers	may	apply	 for	housing	demolition	certificates	 from	 local	governments,	and	
if developers and residents cannot agree local governments will decide whether or not 
residents should be relocated. If they are ordered to relocate but still refuse to move, the 
local government or the court will proceed with forced eviction, even though this clearly 
contravenes the higher-level laws. 
LAWS, REGULATIONS, TREATIES AND THE COURT SYSTEM
In	 contemporary	China,	 there	 is	 a	 significant	 body	 of	 law	 that	 provides	 protection	 for	
property rights. Within the overarching constitutional structure, the legal fabric concerning 
property	issues	consists	of	three	levels.	The	first	level	is	the	General	Principles	of	Civil	Law	
(1986), which is the fundamental item of legislation for China’s civil law system and the 
equivalent of the general section of a Civil Code.27 But it does not contain detailed rules 
pertaining to contract, tort and property. 
Before	the	Property	Law	came	into	effect	in	2007,	provisions	related	to	property	were	
dispersed in various ‘independent’ civil, commercial and property administration laws, 
which constitute the second level of regulation. They included the Company Law (1994),28 
the Guarantee Law29 (1995), the Marriage Law30 (1980, revised 2001) and the Inheritance 
Law (1985).31 A Rural Land Contracting Law,32 passed in 2002, opened the way for 
commodification	of	rural	land	transfer	for	agricultural	purposes.	Property	administration	
laws include the Land Administration Law33 (1986, revised 1988, 1998 and 2004), and the 
Urban Real Estate Administration Law34	 (1994,	amended	2007).	The	third	level	 includes	
provisions in administrative regulations such as ‘the Provisional Regulations on the Grant 
26 Chengshi	Guihua	Fa,	promulgated	on	26	December	1989,	implemented	on	1	April	1990.	
27 The	framework	of	China’s	civil	 law	system	has	been	significantly	 influenced	by	German	Civil	Law,	and	
Taiwanese	legal	scholars	have	also	been	influential	because	they	translated	and	introduced	German	Civil	Law	
concepts to China. 
28 Gongsi	Fa.
29 Danbao	Fa	chs	3,	4,	5,	7.
30 Hunyin	Fa.
31 Jicheng	Fa.
32 Nongcun	Tudi	Chengbao	Fa.
33 Tudi	Guanli	Fa.
34 Chengshi	Fangdichan	Guanli	Fa.
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and Transfer of Use Rights in Urban Land’ (1990).35 Within this hierarchy, however, there 
was (and still is) no clear distinction between public law (gongfa) and private law (sifa), and 
no clear distinction between property protection and government administration. 
It	should	be	noted	that	the	Chinese	Constitution	is	based	on	the	1936	Soviet	Constitution,	
and this helps to explain why there is no formal distinction between public and private law 
of the kind that is found in other civil law systems.36	It	is	therefore	difficult	to	deal	with	the	
relationship between property law and the Constitution37 and its socialist principles, and 
this is the underlying reason for the problematic relationship between public and private 
property. How property law treats public and private ownership is thus also linked to 
the question of whether the Property Law is itself unconstitutional (weixian),38 or at least 
‘contrary’ to socialist principles. In terms of the paradox of ‘an authoritarian state fostering 
a free-market economy while espousing socialism’,39 some scholars from the new left 
wing in China do have reservations about providing ‘sanctity of private property’ in the 
Constitution,40 and also highlight the importance of communal property.41 
In the area of procedural law, the Administration Litigation Law42 is a safeguard 
intended to protect ordinary people from abusive use of administrative power. Article 
26	 specifies	 that	 an	 administrative	 case	may	 be	 brought	 as	 a	 ‘collective	 suit’	 (gongtong 
susong) where two or more persons share the same cause of action, and their cases can be 
handled together. The ‘collective suit’ provides a mechanism for the people to protect their 
property rights in the form of collective action. 
As	analysed	above,	there	are	often	conflicts	between	‘laws’	and	‘regulations’	in	the	area	
of	property	law	in	China	today.	In	order	to	understand	such	conflicts,	we	also	need	to	take	
account of the relationship between law and party policy, as well as the relation between 
the central government and local governments in the process of lawmaking. In the PRC, 
judicial law making is tightly restricted, and the main source of law is legislation.43 In 
addition, a complex hierarchy of law-making power and legislative organs were created 
as ‘a highly pragmatic response to political and institutional pressures’.44 As Keller has 
pointed	 out,	 ‘the	 Chinese	 legal	 order	 therefore	 effectively	 remained	 split	 between	 the	
35 Chengzhen	Guoyou	Tudi	Shiyongquan	Churang	he	Zhuanrang	Zanxing	Tiaoli.	Also	see	this	synthesis	in	
Huang,	FX	(2004)	‘The	Path	to	Clarity:	Development	of	Property	Rights	in	China’	17	Columbia Journal of Asian 
Law 200.
36 For	example,	 the	property	 law	provides	not	only	private	rights	but	also	state	rights.	See	TONG Zhiwei 
(2006)	‘Wuquanfa	(cao’an)	ruhe	tongguo	xianfa	zhimen’	(‘How	Could	the	Property	Law	(Draft)	Pass	the	Door	
to the Constitution’) Faxue (Legal Science)	2	at	4-23.	
37 See	eg	 ibid;	HAN 	Dayuan	(2006)	 ‘You	wuquanfa	cao’an	de	zhenglun	xiangdao	de	ruogan	xianfa	wenti’	
(‘Some	Constitutional	Questions	in	the	Debate	over	Wuquanfa	(Draft)’)	Faxue 24-32.	
38 For	example,	the	debate	over	whether	China	should	have	property	law	was	extremely	heated	before	the	
NPC	and	National	Committee	of	CPPCC	Annual	Sessions	in	March	2006.	Professor	GONG Xiantian at Beijing 
University	 submitted	 a	 public	 letter	 to	 the	 Legislative	Affairs	 Committee	 of	 the	NPC	 in	August	 2005,	 and	
denounced the draft of the Property Law as unconstitutional and contrary to socialist principles. This fuelled 
the debates and delayed the subsequent drafting and reviewing processes. As a result he draft was not passed 
by	the	NPC	Standing	Committee	in	2005	as	scheduled.	
39 See	the	interview	with	WANG Hui in Pankaj Mishra, ‘China’s New Leftist’ The New York Times 15 October 
2006. 
40 See	eg	CUI Zhiyuan	(2003)	‘Caichanquan	yu	xianfa	zhi	guanxi	de	bijiao	yanjiu’	(‘A	Comparative	Study	of	
the Relationship between Property Rights and the Constitution’) Dushu (Reading) 4. 
41 See	Mishra	‘China’s	New	Leftist’	supra	n	39.	
42 Xingzheng	Susong	Fa,	promulgated	by	the	NPC	on	4	April	1989	and	implemented	on	1	October	1990.	
43 Keller,	P	(1994)	‘Sources	of	Order	in	Chinese	Law’	42	American Journal of Comparative Law 712.	
44 Id	at	714.	
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formal legal powers of the NPC, which symbolised the unitary nature of the state, and 
the	 administrative	 power	 of	 the	 central	 and	…	 [provincial]	 bureaucracies	 to	 issue	 and	
enforce normative documents’.45 In these circumstances, whether informal institutions are 
successful	or	get	legalised	largely	depends	on	the	attitudes	of	local	governments,	which	
can either facilitate or obstruct their emergence.46 
Laws are often simply ignored by local governments in the contemporary PRC. 
For	 example,	 in	March	 2004	 article	 13	 of	 the	Constitution	was	 amended,	 requiring	 the	
government	 to	 compensate	 citizens	when	 their	 private	 property	 is	 resumed	 for	 public	
use.47 However, local government (in particular the demolition and eviction management 
department	or	office)	often	sets	its	own	standards	for	compensation,	which	are	very	low	
in most cases.48 Apart from unfair compensation, there is often a lack of consultation and 
a shortage of notice given, so as to prevent residents allying with each other and taking 
collective action (such as through petition or litigation) against the project. There are few 
opportunities for ordinary people to negotiate with either the developers or the local 
government. 
Globalisation	—	especially	entry	into	the	WTO	—	has	brought	important	changes	to	
lawmaking	in	China	in	recent	years.	At	the	international	level,	China	has	signed	and	ratified	
many international conventions in relation to human rights, including the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).49 China has also signed, 
though	not	yet	ratified,50 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.51 Article 
11 of the ICESCR guarantees ‘the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living … 
including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of 
living conditions’. At the national level, ‘protection of human rights’ has been incorporated 
into	the	Constitution	(article	33,	as	amended	2004).	
Yet local regulations and normative documents can be seen even to the inexperienced 
eye to contravene such international obligations. For example, the 2001 Regulation is in 
breach of the ICESCR, especially ‘the right of adequate housing’ (article 11, paragraph 
1). In the ICESCR and relevant UN documents, ‘the right of housing’ and human rights 
are	closely	linked:	‘forced	evictions	[are	a	gross]	violation	of	human	rights	…	the	right	of	
45 Id	at	723.	Normative	documents	refer	to	‘guizhang’. 
46 A	typical	example	of	the	success	in	individual	co-operative	housing	construction	is	in	Wenzhou,	Zhejiang	
Province,	 because	 of	 the	 strong	 business	 associations,	 local	 finance	 and	 support	 from	 local	 government	 in	
Wenzhou.	
47 Art	13	of	 the	Constitution	(amended	in	2004)	states:	 ‘The	 lawful	private	property	of	citizens	may	not	be	
encroached	upon;	by	law,	the	state	protects	citizens’	rights	to	own	private	property	and	the	rights	to	inherit	
private	 property;	 the	 state	may,	 for	 the	 public	 interest,	 acquire	 or	 requisition	 citizen’s	 private	 property	 for	
public use, and pay compensation in accordance with law.’ 
48 Pils,	E	(2006)	‘Land	Disputes,	Rights	Assertion,	and	Social	Unrest	in	China’	19	Columbia Journal of Asian Law 
251. The compensation for farmers is generally even lower than that awarded to urban residents. 
49 Adopted	and	opened	for	signature,	ratification	and	accession	by	General	Assembly	resolution	2200A(XXI)	
of	 16	December	1966,	 entered	 into	 force	3	 January	1976.	On	China’s	 implementation	of	 the	 ICESCR,	 see	eg	
Choukroune,	L	(2005)	‘Justiciability	of	Economic,	Social,	and	Cultural	Rights:	the	UN	Committee	on	Economic,	
Social and Cultural Rights’ Review of China’s First Periodic Report on the Implementation of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ 19 Columbia Journal of Asian Law 1. 
50 On	 the	 ICCPR	 and	 China’s	 possible	 ratification,	 see	 eg	 SUN Shiyan	 (2007)	 ‘The	 Understanding	 and	
Interpretation	of	the	ICCPR	in	the	Context	of	China’s	Possible	Ratification’	6	Chinese Journal of International Law 
1. 
51 Adopted	and	opened	for	signature,	ratification	and	accession	by	General	Assembly	resolution	2200A(XXI)	
of	16	December	1966,	entered	into	force	23	March	1976.	
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adequate housing … includes the right to be protected from forced eviction’.52 Some of the 
procedural safeguards required by the ICESCR cannot be found in Chinese national laws 
and local regulations.53 Enforcement of the obligations in international conventions is still 
difficult	in	China.	
ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Administrative Adjudication and Reconsideration
The	above	sections	have	identified	flaws	and	loopholes	in	the	legal	framework	concerning	
housing demolition and forced eviction, and the further question therefore arises: can 
people seek remedies and get access to justice when their property rights are infringed 
upon, especially by public power? According to the 2001 Regulations (article 16), if 
evictors and evictees cannot achieve an agreement on compensation and relocation, 
demolition and eviction management departments may adjudicate (caijue)54 the disputes. 
When demolition and eviction management departments are the evictees, the disputes 
will be adjudicated by the people’s court at the same administrative level as the demolition 
and eviction management department. According to article 16(2) of the 2001 Regulations, 
an	unsatisfied	party	may	appeal	to	the	people’s	court	against	an	adjudication	outcome.	
However, housing demolition may continue while the appeal is pending. The Ministry 
of Construction issued in 2004 ‘Procedures for Administrative Adjudication Regarding 
Urban Housing Demolition’.55 According to these Procedures, if a large number of residents 
disagree with the compensation and relocation package, a public hearing should be held 
(article	7),	and	evictors	are	forbidden	to	use	forced	measures	in	housing	demolition	such	
as	cutting	off	water,	electricity,	gas	and	heating	(article	24).	
If either party (usually the residents) is disappointed with the decision of administrative 
adjudication,	 the	 unsatisfied	 party	 can	 do	 two	 things	 to	 challenge	 the	 decision.56 The 
first	is	to	apply	for	administrative	reconsideration	(xingzheng fuyi)57 of the decision. The 
other	 is	 to	 file	 suit	 against	 the	 decision	 in	 court.58 If residents are not happy with the 
result of administrative reconsideration, they may appeal to the court for administrative 
litigation (xingzheng susong).59 But neither administrative adjudication nor administrative 
reconsideration provides adequate remedies for residents. Disputes over housing 
52 Office	of	the	High	Commissioner	for	Human	Rights	‘Fact	Sheet	No	25,	Forced	Evictions	and	Human	Rights’	
available	at:	http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs25.htm#2.	
53 See	Davis	and	Lin	‘Demolished’	supra	n	22.	
54 Administrative	adjudication	(xingzheng caiju) is the adjudication of disputes between equal civil entities by 
the administrative authority that administrates the disputed issues. 
55 Chengshi	 Fangwu	 Chaiqian	 Xingzheng	 Caijue	 Gongzuo	 Guicheng,	 promulgated	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Construction	on	30	December	2003,	implemented	on	1	March	2004.	
56 See	 the	 ‘Procedures	 for	 Administrative	 Adjudication	 Regarding	 Urban	 Housing	 Demolition’	 (the	
Procedures) art 16. 
57 See	Xingzheng	Fuyi	Fa	(The	Administrative	Reconsideration	Law)	arts	12-15,	promulgated	by	the	Standing	
Committee	of	the	NPC	on	29	April	1999,	implemented	on	1	October	1999.	Art	12:	‘any	applicant,	who	refuses	to	
accept	a	specific	administrative	act	of	the	department	under	local	people’s	government	at	or	above	the	county	
level may apply for administrative reconsideration to the people’s government at the same level; an applicant 
may also apply for administrative reconsideration to the competent authority at the next higher level.’
58 The	Procedures	art	16.	
59 The	Administrative	Reconsideration	Law	(1999)	art	5.	
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demolition and eviction are adjudicated by demolition and relocation management 
departments	 in	 the	 first	 place,	 and	 these	 departments	 often	 have	 a	 close	 relationship	
with the evictors. Secondly, the Administrative Reconsideration Law provides that only 
concrete administrative acts (juti xingzheng xingwei) may be reviewed,60 which means 
that the legality of local regulations (such as the 2001 Regulation) as the basis of housing 
demolition and forced eviction may not be challenged. 
Administrative Litigation and Mediation
Administration litigation is a possible channel by which ordinary people might seek 
remedies when their property rights are infringed upon.61 Most administrative litigation 
cases now involve disputes over land use, forestry, urban planning and real estate, as 
the ambiguity of property rights has become the main reason for people to initiate such 
litigation. But the role of administrative litigation for the protection of private property 
rights is limited, because according to the Administration Litigation Law, the courts can 
only review concrete administrative acts (article 11): they have no power to review ‘the 
appropriateness of an act’,62 nor laws and local regulations.63  
Mediation is prohibited in administrative litigation.64 But Chinese judicial authorities 
are now encouraging the use of alternative dispute resolution to resolve administrative 
litigation cases.65 Xiao Yang, former president of the Supreme People’s Court, in a speech 
on	29	March	2007,66 stressed the need to adopt new mechanisms to deal with administrative 
litigation disputes, particularly those relating to ‘mass administrative disputes’ (qunti xing 
xingzheng zhengyi) such as land acquisition and housing demolition. Xiao called for the 
Supreme Court to issue judicial interpretations on the phenomena of co-ordination (xietiao) 
and	settlement (hejie) in order to deal with administrative disputes properly. Introducing 
mediation to administrative cases is a double-edged sword, however: on the one hand, 
more mechanisms are provided to resolve administrative litigation cases; on the other, 
it	can	be	seen	as	an	effort	to	divert	sensitive	cases	affecting	a	lot	of	people	and	attracting	
much	social	attention	such	as	land	seizure	and	housing	demolition	out	of	the	courtroom.	
Introducing	mechanisms	 of	mediation	 attempts	 to	 prevent	 the	 interference	 of	 local	
government	in	administrative	cases.	But	if	cases	are	‘settled’,	another	door	will	be	opened	
for local government to put pressure on the case, especially in light of the problems of 
China’s laws and regulations. The crux of China’s legal system is the single ‘political-
legal system’ (zhengfa xitong) which includes not only the courts but also the political-legal 
60 Id	art	7.	
61 Administrative	 litigation	 is	 also	 an	 important	 perspective	 to	 investigate	 the	 reshaped	 relation	 between	
the state and society in post-Mao China. The Administrative Litigation Law was passed in April 1989 and 
implemented in October 1990.
62 See	eg	Peerenboom,	R	(2002)	China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law Cambridge University Press at 420. On 
administrative litigation in China, see eg PEI 	Minxin	(1997)	‘Citizens	v	Mandarins:	Administrative	Litigation	
in China’ The China Quarterly 420-24. 
63 Normative	documents	are	not	binding	on	the	court.	
64 The	Administrative	Litigation	Law	art	50.	
65 On	 this	 issue,	 also	 see	 Palmer,	 M	 (2009)	 ‘Compromising	 Courts	 and	 Harmonizing	 Ideologies:	 Judicial	
Mediation in Post-Deng China’ in Harding, A and Nicholson, P (eds) New Courts in the Asia-Pacific Region 
Routledge. 
66 See	XIAO 	Yang’s	speech	at	the	fifth	National	Administrative	Adjudication	Conference	on	29	March	2007,	
available at: http://www.court.gov.cn/news/bulletin/activity/200703300020.htm. 
JCL 4:2           107
	 ting	xu
committee	of	the	Chinese	Communist	Party,	procuratorates,	police,	prison	and	the	forced	
labour system.67	In	such	a	system,	any	law	should	accurately	reflect	the	concurrent	party	
policy. The Supervision Law (2006)68	has	not	made	any	difference	to	this	situation.	Under	
this	 law,	 the	Standing	Committees	of	People’s	Congresses	have	 the	power	 to	supervise	
the government, people’s courts and people’s procuratorates, but these congresses are 
all ‘state organs under the leadership of the party’.69 In this system the judiciary lacks 
autonomy, and their rulings are constrained by local party organs (such as the political-
legal	 committees)	 and	 local	 governments.70 Judges are on the government payroll, and 
listed in bianzhi71 as civil servants.72 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
From the above analysis, we can see that the very meaning of ‘private property’ is 
ambiguous and there are still few remedies and procedures available to protect private 
property rights in the contemporary Chinese legal system. The judicialisation of the 
Constitution	may	offer	the	possibility	of	changing	the	situation:	ordinary	people	are	able	
to lodge litigation to correct any infringement upon their constitutional rights by abusive 
government	power	and	the	ineffective	protection	of	their	constitutional	rights	by	the	court.	
Indeed there have been several positive moves in this direction: private property rights 
were incorporated into the Constitution in 2004 as one kind of constitutional right, and 
ordinary people can challenge public authorities through administrative litigation when 
their rights are infringed. Now they should even be given the opportunity to pursue 
constitutional	litigation.	But	that	raises	questions	about	the	specific	mechanisms	for	such	
litigation.	For	example,	who	would	file	suit,	and	at	what	stage	of	the	process	of	property	
confiscation	should	a	suit	be	brought?	
In terms of the question of the enforceability of private property rights in the Chinese 
Constitution, there are many barriers to enforcement. For one thing, there is still a 
fundamental imbalance between public power (gongquan) and private rights (siquan). The 
focus of this article has been land requisition and housing demolition, providing a lens 
through which to examine state requisition as an example of the vulnerability of Chinese 
private property rights to public power. This shows that in reality private property does 
not yet have the same protection as public property. Even in the case of land acquisition 
67 On	the	political-legal	system	in	China	see	eg	Tanner,	MS	(1999)	The Politics of Lawmaking in Post-Mao China: 
Institutions, Processes, and Democratic Prospects Clarendon Press. 
68 Geji	 Renmin	 Daibiao	 Dahui	 Changwu	 Weiyuanhui	 Jiandu	 Fa	 (The	 Supervision	 Law	 of	 the	 Standing	
Committee	of	the	People’s	Congress	at	Different	Levels),	promulgated	by	the	standing	committee	of	the	NPC	
on	27	August	2006,	implemented	on	1	January	2007.	
69 See	‘Keep	a	Close	Watch’,	State	Council	Information	Office	of	the	PRC,	1	October	2006,	available	at:	http://
www.scio.gov.cn/zgxwybd/en/2006/19/200610/t101717.htm. 
70 The	‘Seed	Case’	(Zhongzi An) in Henan is a typical example illustrating the lack of autonomy of the judiciary. 
In this case, a judge ruled that the regulation promulgated by the Provincial People’s Congress went against the 
regulation	promulgated	by	the	Standing	Committee	of	the	NPC,	and	this	judge	was	removed	from	her	post.	On	
this case, see eg Yardley, J (2005) ‘A Judge Tests China’s Courts, Making History’ The New York Times 28 November, 
available	at:	http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/28/international/asia/28judge.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1.	
71 The	bianzhi system	refers	to	organisation	establishment	and	staffing:	each	organisation	is	allocated	a	certain	
personnel	quota	and	relevant	official	posts.	On	the	bianzhi system, see also Foster KW (2002) ‘Embedded within 
State Agencies: Business Association in Yantai’ The China Journal 45-48 
72 It	should	be	noted	that	most	judges	in	most	countries	are	paid	by	the	government.	In	Europe	(the	UK	is	
an exception) judges are rather like civil servants. But Chinese judges are embedded in the one-party system. 
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for ‘public interest’, fair compensation should be provided, and this principle should be 
integrated	into	the	Constitution	followed	by	specific	and	enforceable	mechanisms	provided	
in property law. Without genuine ‘fairness principles’, the revival of private property is 
limited	 by	 the	 difficulties	 encountered	 in	 enforcing	 private	 property	 rights.	Moreover,	
many ideological issues have to be dealt with: equal protection for public and private 
property is still regarded as unconstitutional by some Chinese legal theorists. The process 
of	law-making	in	China	shows	a	pattern	in	which	‘reality’	pushes	the	law	to	reform,	and	it	
struggles to strike a balance between party policy and law as well as between central and 
local law-making.73 Therefore to examine the right to private property and its enforcement 
we need to look at the political and institutional contexts. 
73 One	 of	 the	 most	 significant	 examples	 of	 this	 practice	 surfaced	 in	 1987,	 when	 the	 Party	 approved	 and	
experimented	with	the	grant	of	land	use	rights	in	selected	localities	such	as	Shenzhen,	although	this	practice	
obviously	contravened	the	Constitution.	The	first	auction	of	land	use	rights	in	Shenzhen	was	on	1	December	
1987;	four	months	later,	on	12	April	1988,	the	Constitution	was	amended	to	allow	the	transfer	of	land	use	rights	
(art 10, clause 4). 
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GLOSSARY OF CHINESE TERMS
English Translation        Chinese Characters        Pinyin Romanisation
administrative adjudication   行政裁决                xingzheng caiju
administrative litigation           行政诉讼               xingzheng susong
administrative means              行政手段                xingzheng shouduan
administrative reconsideration      行政复议                   xingzheng fuyi
adjudicate                      裁决 caijue
concrete administrative acts        具体行政行为 juti xingzheng xingwei
collective suit  共同诉讼 gongtong susong
coordination                   协调 xietiao
forced eviction                  强制拆迁 qiangzhi chaiqian
individual economy              个体经济 geti jingji 
judicialisation of the Constitution  宪法司法化 xianfa sifa hua
land acquisition                  土地征收 tudi zhengshou
married the daughter twice 一女二嫁  yi nü er jia
mass administrative disputes 群体性行政争议 quntixing xingzheng zhengyi
normative documents             规章 guizhang
organisation establishment        编制 bianzhi
					and	staffing																			
private                        私 si
private economy                 私营经济        siying jingji
private law                      私法                    sifa
private rights                   私权                    siquan
public     公                      gong
public interest                   公共利益                gonggong liyi
public law                      公法                    gongfa
public power                   公权                   gongquan
QI	Yuling	 齐玉苓
requisition of land use rights  土地使用权征用         tudishiyongquan zhengyong      
savage eviction                  野蛮拆迁               yeman chaiqian
settlement																					 和解  hejie
the nailed down house          钉子户 dingzi hu
the political-legal system         政法系统 zhengfa xitong
the ‘Seed Case’                 种子案 Zhongzi an
the temporary living permit         暂住证 zanzhu zheng
three supremes                  三个至上  sange zhishang
the state-owned land use rights    国有土地使用权证        guoyoutudi                                        
					certificate	 	 					shiyongquan zheng                         
unconstitutional                 违宪 weixian
XIAO Yang                     肖扬
